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THE GOVERNMENTAL CHALLENGE TO PATENT VALIDITY
AFTER UNITED STATES v. GLAXO GROUP LTD.
Shortly before the beginning of this century, the United States Supreme
Court, in three cases involving American Bell Telephone Company,' devel-
oped the rule that the United States had standing to challenge the validity of
a patent only when it claimed that the patent was obtained through fraud.
Fifty years later, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,2 the Court
decided that the government could challenge a patent relied upon in defense
to an antitrust claim. In a recent decision, United States v. Glaxo Group
Ltd.,8 the Court held that the government may, in certain antitrust circum-
stances, challenge a patent although it was not raised in defense to the anti-
trust claim. However, the Court did not precisely define the limits of this
expanded governmental power to challenge patents. This paper will ex-
amine that question.
THE AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY CASES4
Bell I was a case of first impression. The government brought suit to
void and recall two patents, alleging the patents would not have been issued
but for fraudulent statements made by Bell. The Telephone Company de-
murred, contending that no party nor any court had authority in the matter.5
If that were correct, the Court reasoned, the government would be utterly
helpless to correct a mistake or redress a fraud, and the representative of
sixty million people would have no remedy.6 Although patents for inven-
1. United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888), United
States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U.S. 548 (1895), United States v. American
Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897). Hereafter referred to respectively as
Bell 1, Bell H1, and Bell II.
2. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1947).
3. 93 S. Ct. 861 (1973).
4. Cases cited note I supra.
5. 128 U.S. 315, 351 (1888).
The defendant demurs as to each patent specifically, 'that the complainant,
in and by its said bill, does not show any power or authority, and no power or
authority in law exists, in any person or party, or any court, to bring said suit,
nor to entertain the same, nor to give the relief therein prayed, nor any relief
thereunder or touching the subject matter thereof; and further, 'that the com-
plainant, in and by said bill, has not made or stated a case which calls upon
or justifies this court, in the exercise of its discretion, to permit this bill to be
entertained.'
6. Id. at 357.
It [the demurrer] assumes that the Government, which has thus been imposed
upon and deceived, is utterly helpless, and that it can take no steps to correct
the evil or to redress the fraud. If such a fraud were practiced upon an in-
dividual he would have a remedy in any court having jurisdiction to correct
frauds and mistakes and to relieve against accident; but it is said that the
Government of the United States-the representative of sixty millions of
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tions presented a new situation, it had been held repeatedly that the courts
had jurisdiction to set aside a patent for land, even though there was no ex-
press act of Congress authorizing such procedure. 7 Since these two types of
patents were of the same nature, character and validity, and eminated from
the Constitution,8 it was held that the courts did have jurisdiction to hear the
suit. The Telephone Company then argued that although the Court had
jurisdiction, the government lacked standing because it had no property right
or pecuniary interest in the relief sought. However, the Court found that the
essence of the government's right was its obligation to protect the public
from a monopoly procured by fraud.9 As to the contention that the govern-
ment had no property right, the Court characterized the issuance of a patent
as follows:
The United States . . . has taken from the public rights of im-
mense value and bestowed them on the patentee . . . . This is
property, property of a value so large that nobody has been able to
estimate it. . .. That the Government. . . should find it to be
its duty to correct this evil, to recall these patents, to get a remedy
for this fraud, is so clear that it needs no argument. .... 10
The Telephone Company conceded this to be true with regard to land,
but argued that Congress had distinguished patents for invention when it had
provided that defendants in infringement suits could plead fraud. Since
there was no similar provision whereby the government could plead fraud,
it was contended that the infringer's remedy for fraud superseded all others.
The Court noted that the right given to the infringer was a personal one and
that a successful defense by one infringer had no effect in preventing the
patentee from suing other infringers. However, the suit of the government,
if successful, would declare the patent void and put an end to all suits which
the patentee could bring. The Court found it impossible to suppose that
Congress, in giving the right to the individual, had intended to take away
people, acting for them, on their behalf, and under their authority--can have
no remedy against a fraud which affects them all, and whose influence may be
unlimited.
7. Id. at 358.
. . . [T]his court has repeatedly held . . . that in regard to patents issued
by the Government for lands conveyed to individuals or to corporations, the
Circuit Courts of the United States do have jurisdiction to set aside and
cancel them for frauds committed by the parties to whom they were issued.
. . . And it is also to be observed that in those cases there is no express
Act of Congress authorizing such procedure, a ground of objection which is
here urged.
8. Id. at 358, 359.
The power, therefore, to issue a patent for an invention, and the authority
to issue such an instrument for a grant of land, emanate from the same
source, and although exercised by different bureaux or officers under the
Government, are of the same nature, character and validity, and imply in
each case the exercise of the power of the Government according to modes
regulated by Acts of Congress.
9. Id. at 367.
10. Id. at 370.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the greater right of the government.11  The Court indicated that while
this applied to the case of fraud, not all of the statutory defenses to infringe-
ment could be expanded to permit the government to bring suit.
Some of these. . . grounds of defense are not such as would ordi-
narily be sufficient in a court of equity to set aside the patent, as
"that it had been in public use or on sale in this country for more
than two years," or "that it had been patented or described in some
printed publication prior to his supposed invention or discovery
thereof." It is unnecessary to decide whether these grounds now
would be sufficient cause for setting aside a patent in a suit by the
United States; but they are not of that general character which
would give a court of equity jurisdiction to do that, except as it
may be said they are now parts of the general system of the patent
law.'
2
It thus appears that the Court in Bell 1 considered that an error on the
part of the Patent Office would be insufficient to support a governmental
claim to set aside a patent.
Seven years later, in Bell 1H, the government challenged patents on the
basis of both fraud and error. The claims regarding error were that the in-
vention was covered by a previous patent, that the patent was not for the
same invention as described in the patent application, and that the patent
was barred by public use of the invention by more than two years before the
application date. Reviewing its decision in Bell I, the Court stated:
In [Bell I] . . . it was decided that where a patent for a grant of
any kind issued by the United States has been obtained by fraud,
by mistake, or by accident, a suit by the United States against the
patentee is the proper remedy for relief, and that. . . where pat-
ents for land and inventions are issued by the authority of the gov-
ernment, and by officers appointed for that purpose who may have
been imposed upon by fraud or deceit, or may have erred as to
their power, or made mistakes in the instrument itself, the appro-
priate remedy is by proceedings by the United States against the
patentee (emphasis added) .1
In Bell III, a case reviewing the same facts presented in Bell H, the
Court distinguished patents for invention from patents for land. A land pat-
ent was a conveyance of property which created title. The inventor ob-
tained no title or rights to his own invention that he did not already have. All
that the inventor received was the ability to restrain others with regard to his
11. Id. at 372.
This broad and conclusive effect of a decree of the court, in a suit of that
character brought by the United States, is so widely different, so much more
beneficial, and is pursued under circumstances so much more likely to secure
complete justice, than any defense which can be made by an individual in-
fringer, that it is impossible to suppose that Congress, in granting this right
to the individual, intended to supersede or take away the more enlarged remedy
of the Government.
12. Id. at 372-73.
13. 159 U.S. 548, 555 (1895).
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invention, and that he could have done by keeping it secret. The Court also
found that:
The government parted with nothing by the patent. It lost no
property. Its possessions were not diminished. The patentee, so
far as a personal use is concerned, received nothing which he did
not have without the patent, and the monopoly which he did re-
ceive was only for a few years.14
It was explained that since the government had no proprietary or pe-
cuniary interest in setting aside the patent, it was not seeking to discharge
its obligations to the public and therefore the principles governing like cases
between private litigants would apply. Since it had been previously de-
cided that private parties could not bring suit to cancel a patent,', the gov-
ernment, without showing an obligation to the public, would be likewise pre-
cluded. Although the Court recognized that the government did have stand-
ing due to its obligation to protect the public against a monopoly it had
wrongfully created, here the rules of equity would not so permit:
Doubtless the removal from the public of the burden of a monopoly
charged to have been wrongfully created was also one of the ob-
jects [of this suit]. . . .To what extent this may relieve the gov-
ernment as suitor from all the rules governing the suits of private
individuals need not be specifically determined here.
One of the familiar rules of equity. . . is that "suits in equity
shall not be sustained in . . . any case where a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy may be had at law." The objection to the
validity of this patent. . . is open to every individual charged by
the patentee with infringement . . . . The government, therefore,
if seeking simply to protect the right of an individual, ought not to
be permitted to maintain a suit in equity to cancel that against
which the individual has a perfect legal defense. . . . The query
is pressed whether the same rule would not also apply where the
government is only seeking to protect the public at large, for the
public is but the aggregation of all the individuals, and if each of
them has a perfect defense to the patent, so all together have.16
The Court did not directly answer that query. Instead, it pointed out that
a suit to cancel a deed could not be maintained if the deed was void on its face,
because such a deed could never be used to destroy the title. Thus, if the
evidence of the government was as claimed, the patent was absolutely void,
and equity had no jurisdiction to cancel "that which by record and unfailing
evidence is, as claimed, absolutely void."' 7
14. 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897). But see text at note 10 supra.
15. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434 (1871).
16. 167 U.S. 224, 266 (1897).
17. id. at 266-67.
... [It has often been held that while one having the title to and possession
of a tract of land can maintain a suit in equity to cancel a deed or other
instrument which is a cloud upon the title, such suit cannot be sustained if the
deed or instrument is void upon its face, its invalidity resting upon matters of
record, and not affected by any lapse of time or statute of limitations. In
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Since there was no statutory authority for the government to institute
such an action, the Court, contrary to its philosophy in Bell I, reasoned that
Congress believed the government ought not to interfere and that ample pro-
visions had been made for securing the rights of all without governmental in-
tervention.18 While Bell III did not specifically deny standing to the govern-
ment, the following interpretation given to Bell IH had the practical result of
preventing the government from seeking to cancel a patent on the basis of
error on the part of the patent officials:
But while there was thus rightfully affirmed the power of the gov-
ernment to proceed by suit in equity against one who had wrong-
fully obtained a patent . . . there was no attempt to define the
character of the . . . mistake, or the extent of the error as to
power which must be established before a decree could be en-
tered canceling the patent. It was not affirmed that . . . the ex-
istence of any error on the part of the officers as to the extent of
their power, or that any mistake in the instrument was sufficient to
justify a decree of cancellation. Least of all was it intended to be
affirmed that the courts . . . could entertain jurisdiction of a suit
by the United States to set aside a patent for an invention on the
mere ground of error of judgment on the part of the patent offi-
cials.19
THE LIMITED ANTITRUST EXCEPTION
The Sherman Act 20 made monopolies and agreements in restraint of
trade illegal. Although the patent monopoly grant is authorized by the
Constitution, 21 the antitrust laws resulted in new standards to measure
the limits of this monopoly. In cases involving price-fixing, 22 a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, the Court has held that a licensee could
attack the validity of a patent in order to avoid paying royalties, even though
the licensee had agreed not to do so; the Court finding the Sherman Act vio-
lation enough to support the challenge. Thus, in deciding United States v.
United States Gypsum Co.,2 3 the Court concluded that if the licensor could
other words, the deed or instrument is not considered a cloud if it can never
be used to destroy his title or disturb his possession. The objection to this
patent on the ground stated is an objection resting upon matters of record-
of record in the Patent Office; not dependent on oral testimony nor subject to
change, and in no way affected by lapse of time. Within the scope of this
specific application of the general rule it would seem that equity has no
jurisdiction, either at the suit of the government or of an individual, to
formally cancel that which by record and unfailing evidence is, as claimed,
absolutely void.
18. 167 U.S. 224, 267 (1897). Contra, note 11 supra and accompanying text.
19. Id. at 269.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
21. U.S. Const. art. I § 8.
22. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Edward
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); MacGregor v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
23. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1947).
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not assert the shield of patentability against a private antitrust defendant,
neither should it have that shield against the government in an antitrust case.
In Gypsum, in what the concurring opinion regarded as deliberate dicta, 24 the
Court stated:
The trial court thought that the issue was controlled by [Bell III]
. . .in which the United States was held without standing to bring
a suit in equity to cancel a patent on the ground of invalidity.
While this issue need not be decided to dispose of this case, it
seems inadvisable to leave the decision as a precedent.
25
Then the Court distinguished between the cancellation sought in Bell III and
the validity challenge sought in Gypsum:
The United States does not claim that the patents are invalid be-
cause they have been employed in violation of the Sherman Act
and that a decree should issue canceling the patents; rather the
government charges that the defendants have violated the Sherman
Act because they granted licenses under patents which in fact were
invalid. If the government were to succeed in showing that the
patents were in fact invalid, such a finding would not in itself re-
sult in a judgment for cancellation of the patents. 26
The Gypsum Court clearly believed that the government's obligation to pro-
tect the public against restraints of trade and monopolies, as bolstered by
the Sherman Act, was enough to overcome the objections to the challenge
raised in Bell III; at least in the instance where the patent was raised in de-
fense. Thus, the government obtained standing in antitrust cases, absent
any statutory authority, to challenge patents which were raised in defense of
otherwise illegal acts.
UNITED STATES V. GLAXO GROUP LTD.
Glaxo was an antitrust case involving restraint in the sale of the anti-
biotic griseofulvin. Griseofulvin is manufactured in bulk form, then cut with
inert ingredients to the dosage form for use. In the United States, bulk form
griseofulvin is neither patented nor patentable. Two British drug compan-
ies, Glaxo and Imperial Chemical Industries Limited (ICI), contracted,
among other things, that ICI would undertake "not to sell and to use its best
24. Id. at 403 (concurring opinion).
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id. The difference that the Court found between cancellation and invalidity
seems not to have attracted much attention. However, in a later antitrust case, Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965),
the Court noted that a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity
did not directly seek the patent's annulment. Gypsum and Walker arguably indicate
that the Court saw Bell III as prohibiting the government from obtaining an in rem
decree concerning a patent, while the antitrust relief permitted was essentially limited
to an in personam effect. Such a difference, if it existed, seems unimportant when con-
sidered in fight of the decision in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), where it was held that a decree adjudging a patent invalid
in an infringement suit would act essentially in rem.
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endeavors to prevent its subsidiaries and associates from selling any griseo-
fulvin in bulk . . . without Glaxo's express consent .... -27 Glaxo and
ICI subsequently entered into bulk sales agreements with three American
drug companies, American Home Products Corp., Schering Corp., and John-
son & Johnson. The agreements provided that these buyers would not per-
mit the resale of any bulk form griseofulvin without the express consent of
the seller (ICI or Glaxo). The government claimed that these bulk sales
restrictions were illegal restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Since bulk form griseofulvin was not a patented product, the alleged violation
does not seem to depend upon patent considerations, 28 and if so, the case
could be decided, as was Gypsum, without reference to patents.
Although bulk form griseofulvin was not patented as a product, both
the methods by which it was manufactured and the dosage forms were pat-
ented.29 Glaxo owned all of the United States patents except one pertaining
to the dosage form. That patent was owned by ICI, and it was this dosage
patent which the government initially sought to challenge. Glaxo obtained
rights to this patent as part of the Glaxo-ICI sales agreement noted above, in
which it also granted to ICI rights under its bulk manufacturing and dosage
patents. The three subsequent sales agreements to the American drug com-
panies contained the resale restraint and rights to process bulk form into
dosage form.30 The government alleged that the effect of the restraint on
the resale of the bulk form, contained in these four agreements, was:
[T]o prevent competition between the defendants and the licensees
in the sale of griseofulvin in bulk form; to prevent competition
among the licensees in the sale of griseofulvin in bulk form; to
guarantee each licensee freedom from competition from others re-
sulting from the sale of bulk form griseofulvin by licensees to such
others; to control and restrain the licensees in respect to the man-
ner in which, and the persons through whom, they market griseo-
julvin; to prevent access by third persons to sources of griseofulvin
in bulk form; to prevent third persons from packaging bulk form
griseofulvin into dosage form and selling it for use by consumers; to
place restrictions on, or to subject to conditions, the resale of gri-
seofulvin which the licensees purchase from defendants; to deprive
the public, and particular consumers of drugs, of the benefits of
free and open competition in griseofulvin (emphasis added). 31
27. 93 S. Ct. 861, 863-64 (1973).
28. This view, that the violation did not depend upon patent considerations, was
taken by the district court and the minority in the Supreme Court. See notes 37 & 52
infra.
29. References to the specific patents are at 302 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 nn.10 & 11 (D.D.C.
1969) and 93 S. Ct. 861, 863 nn.1 & 2 (1973).
30. The details of these agreements, as given by 302 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1969)
and 93 S. Ct. 861, 863-64 (1973), do not indicate that rights under the bulk manufactur-
ing patents were also granted to the American companies. However, the Supreme
Court indicates, Id. at n.3, that the American companies could have manufactured the
bulk form under Glaxo's patents.
31. 302 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1969). Although the restraint was on the resale
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The government also alleged that the ICI dosage patent was invalid because,
among other reasons,3 2 it claimed a substance long in the public domain.
Later the government moved to amend its complaint to allege the invalidity
of a Glaxo dosage patent . 3 To support its standing to challenge the patents,
the government argued:
We submit that . . . Gypsum . . . should be understood more
broadly to support challenge to any patent used by antitrust de-
fendants in furtherance of their illegal program .... Without
the Imperial [dosage] patent the defendants could not maintain
their monopoly in the United States over the drug, for then anyone
who could secure bulk form griseofulvin could make it up into pills
and sell them without a patent to stop him; bulk form griseofulvin
is . . . unpatented. The Imperial [dosage] patent thus bolsters the
effectiveness of the illegal restraint on . . . bulk form griseofulvin;
if a small drug company somehow manages to get the unpatented
bulk form drug despite ICI's restraint . . . the defendants may
still suppress the manufacture of the drug by threat of patent in-
fringement suit. . . . [T]here is a double impediment to com-
merce---the patent and the conspiracy (emphasis added).8 4
ICI filed affidavits swearing that it did not intend to, and in any event
would not, raise its patent in defense of the antitrust claims. The district
court, therefore, found Gypsum to be inapposite, and determined that the
issue was "whether the United States can challenge ICI's patent independent
of any antitrust claims" (emphasis added).3 5 In deciding the issue, the trial
court concluded that the Bell cases applied, and the government was denied
standing. For the same reasons, the government was not allowed to chal-
lenge the Glaxo patent. The trial court found that all of the bulk sales re-
strictions were per se violations of the Sherman Act and enjoined their
future use. However, it refused to grant the government's request for man-
datory sales of the bulk form and compulsory licensing of all of the defen-
dants' griseofulvin patents, 3 for it found no patent misuse or any patent re-
of the bulk form, the complaint includes both the dosage form and what is simply
referred to as griseofulvin. See note 36 infra.
32. 93 S. Ct. 861, 864 n.4 (1973). The government also argued that the claims
were invalid because they did not specify an effective amount or the diseases which
could be cured.
33. Id. at 864 n.6. The government claimed prior disclosure, prior public use,
and that the product had long been in the public domain.
34. Id. at 867 n.7. It is noteworthy that in the trial court the government did not
claim that the violation depended upon the patent, but only that the patent "bolstered"
the restraint. See note 28 supra.
35. 302 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1969). One possible construction of the
emphasized portion is that the claimed violations were independent of the dosage
patent. See note 28 supra and note 37 infra.
36. 328 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1971). Although it only attempted to challenge
the dosage patents, the government sought compulsory licensing of all of the ICI and
Glaxo patents relating to griseofulvin. This grouping of dosage and bulk manufactur-
ing patents was unfortunate, for they are not distinguished in discussions concerning
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lationship to the bulk sales violation.87 The government took a direct ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the six member majority, found that
Bell III held:
[The federal courts should not entertain suits by the Government
"to set aside a patent for an invention on the mere ground of error
in judgment on the part of the patent officials," at least where the
United States "has no proprietary or pecuniary [interest] . . . in
the setting aside of the patent; is not seeking to discharge its obli-
gations to the public ....
The Court pointed out that it had, in Gypsum, considered Bell III but had
declared that the public interest in enjoining violations of the Sherman Act
had warranted permitting the government to attack the validity of patents
used to justify otherwise illegal anticompetitive conduct. The Court sum-
marized cases39 in which patent challenges had been allowed because of the
public interest in free competition and concluded:
We think that the principle of these cases is sufficient authority
for permitting the Government to raise and litigate the validity of
the ICI-Glaxo patents in this antitrust case . . . .[A]ppellees had
. . .restrained trade by prohibiting the licensee from selling or re-
selling patented bulk-form griseofulvin . . . . These charges were
sustained, the court concluding that . . . the patent license provi-
sions were per se restraints of trade in the griseofulvin product
market (emphasis added). 40
the compulsory licensing issue. This, in turn, results in further loss of the distinction
between bulk griseofulvin and dosage griseofulvin. See note 31 supra.
37. Even including the bulk manufacturing patents, which were not challenged,
the trial court found: "Plaintiff has not shown on this record that defendants' current
licensing practices are related to the adjudged antitrust violation nor are they methods
to circumvent the prohibition of restraints on resale [of bulk form] .... There has
been no showing that either Glaxo or ICI has abused its patent rights and, therefore,
they are entitled to exercise the limited monopoly rights granted by law to patent
holders." Id. at 713-14. See note 28 supra.
38. 93 S. Ct. 861, 865 (1973). See text at notes 14, 15 & 19 supra.
39. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1967); Sola Elec.
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago
Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 329
U.S. 402 (1947); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892) (holding that
covenants by licensee not to contest validity of patents were oppressive and uncon-
sionable, and since it appeared that the licensee was probably unaware of their legal
import, equity would not enforce them); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)
(holding that licensee was not estopped from attacking validity of patent and the
licensee was entitled to avoid payment of royalties accruing after patent issued if the
licensee could prove the invalidity of the patent).
40. 93 S. Ct. 861, 865 (1973). Perhaps the reference to "patented" bulk form
is a mistake or misprint; perhaps the intended word was "unpatented". However,
since the manufacturing processes for the bulk form were patented, it is possible that
the Court is considering the bulk form to be "substantially" patented, particularly
since those patents were included in the compulsory licensing request. The Supreme
Court interpretation of the District Court decision is quite broad; the latter found the
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With the violation so established, the Court connected the challenge to
the dosage patents with the relief for the bulk sales violation:
The District Court was then faced with the Government's at-
tack on the pertinent patents as well as its demand for mandatory
sales [of bulk] and reasonable-royalty licensing [of all patents],
the latter being well established forms of relief when necessary to
an effective remedy, particularly where patents have provided the
leverage for or have contributed to the antitrust violation adjudi-
cated (emphasis added).
4 1
Thus, the Court indicated that patents which provide leverage are the perti-
nent patents for challenge. But, not indicating just what leverage was, the
Court emphasized the importance of relief:
[W]e think it would have been appropriate, if it appeared that the
Government's claims for further relief were substantial, for the
court to have also entertained the Government's challenge to the
validity of those patents.
42
[T]he district courts have jurisdiction . . . to fashion effective re-
lief. This often involves a substantial question as to whether it is
necessary to limit the bundle of rights normally vested in the owner
of a patent . . . . The litigation would usually proceed on the as-
sumption that valid patents are involved, but if this basic assump-
tion is itself challenged, we perceive no good reason. . . for refus-
ing to hear and decide it.
43
The question remains whether the Government's case for addi-
tional relief was sufficient to provide the appropriate predicate for
a consideration of its challenge to the validity of these patents.
For this purpose. . . its case need not be conclusive but only sub-
stantial enough to warrant the court undertaking what could be a
large inquiry, but one which could easily obviate other questions of
remedy if the patent is found invalid . . . . Here, we think not
only that the United States presented a substantial case for addi-
tional relief, but . . . that the District Court . . . should have
ruled favorably on the demand for mandatory sales and compul-
sory licensing.
44
Without leverage provided by the patents, the government would not
have had a substantial claim for relief which would effect the patent rights.
One problem, however, is that the relief which the government requested ef-
fected all the patents, not just those for the dosage form. At first glance,
it may seem easier to make a substantial claim that compulsory licensing of
bulk sales provisions to be per se restraints, and that there was no abuse of patent
rights, 328 F. Supp. 709, 710 (D.D.C. 1971). See notes 36 & 37 supra.





the bulk manufacturing patents is the proper relief for bulk sales restraints
than it does to make the same argument for the compulsory licensing of the
dosage patents. In giving its reasons for holding that compulsory licensing
and mandatory bulk sales45 should have been granted, the Court made few
distinctions between the two types of patents. When it did refer specifically
to the dosage patents, it found that it was "clear from the evidence ' 46 that
the dosage patent, "along with other ICI and Glaxo patents" 47 provided the
economic leverage that permitted the defendants to obtain agreement to the
illegal restraints. This was because Glaxo "apparently" 4 refused to sub-
license the dosage patent without the bulk restraint. However, as the dis-
senting opinion noted, there had been "no such evidence" 49 of economic lever-
age and the district court had found neither a relationship between patents and
the violation, nor any patent misuse.5 0 The dissent also pointed out that one
of the patents which the government sought to challenge had not been is-
sued at the time the restraints were initially imposed,51 impliedly question-
ing how a non-existent patent could exert the necessary leverage. Thus,
the three dissenting members of the Court could find no relationship between
the bulk sales restraint and the dosage patents.
52
The argument that there was no relationship between the dosage patents
and the violative bulk restraint might be stated as follows: admittedly, there
can be no question that the control of the dosage patents was economically
desirable to the defendants, or that such control allowed them some control
of the dosage-form wholesale market. Nor does the government's conten-
tion in the district court, that the dosage patent "bolstered" the illegal re-
straint,53 seem questionable. However, saying that the patents bolstered the
violation is quite different from implying that the buyers would not have en-
tered into such an agreement without being levered into it by the dosage pat-
ents. Would it have been impossible or unreasonable to make a restrictive
bulk sales agreement if all the patents, instead of just one, had not existed
at the time of the agreement? If the patents expired, causing any leverage
to vanish, is it clear that a restrictive bulk agreement would be impossible?
Was it necessary, in order to fashion effective relief for a restraint of bulk
sales, to go so far as to allow for the possible cancellation of the dosage pat-
45. This relief, mandatory bulk sales, is relevant to the dosage patents only to
the etxent that they are related to the bulk sales violation.
46. 93 S. Ct. 861, 866 (1973).
47. Id. Apparently these patents also would have been, or still are, subject to
-ballenge by the government.
48. Id. at 867. The Court seems to be paraphrasing the government's argu-
ment in the District Court. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion).
50. See note 37 supra.
51. 93 S. Ct. 861, 872 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
52. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion). "The two patents which this Court is now
authorizing the Government to challenge bear no relationship whatsoever to the il-
legal restraint found."
53. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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ents? Were not the enjoining of future bulk sales restraints, the ordering of
mandatory bulk sales, and the ordering of compulsory licensing of the bulk
manufacturing patents enough to remedy the bulk sales restriction? Was
not the permitting of the dosage patent challenge a penalty, rather than re-
lief? One may be tempted to answer these questions on the basis that the
dosage patents were not related to the bulk violation, and that this case
should not have involved those patents at all. Indeed, the leading case con-
cerning this type of sales restraint5 4 did not involve patent considerations;
there the buyer wanted the product and was willing to agree to limit his re-
sales in order to get it. How is Glaxo different?
The difference in Glaxo, and what the above argument ignores, is the
use to which the product can be put after it is purchased. In the commercial
situation involving unpatented products, the buyer has at least two choices as
to what he will do with something he has purchased: he can resell it in the
same form in which he bought it, or he can use it in some other way, perhaps
reselling it in an altered form. Since he is free to use the product for his own
manufacturing purposes, he might reasonably agree not to resell it in the
same form in which he bought it. If so, it would be difficult to conclude
that anything other than his own desire levered him into the restrictive agree-
ment. On the other hand, if the known commercial uses and processes for
the product are protected by patents under which he has no rights, his only
motive for buying such a product would be to resell it in unchanged form.
No reasonable buyer in such a position would agree not to resell the product
in the same form, for then he could neither sell it nor use it. It is not difficult
to conclude that the buyer of such a product was levered into a restrictive
agreement in order to obtain the necessary patent rights, and not simply by
his own desire. Adopting this line of reasoning, little direct evidence of
patent misuse or leverage is needed, for the restrictive agreement clearly de-
pends on obtaining the patent rights. Further, it then becomes more rea-
sonable to contend that as long as those patents exist, mandatory sales of the
product will provide little effective relief from the conditions accompanying the
initial restraint. Thus, compulsory licensing of the patent rights would be
a more reasonable relief. Whether this rationale can support a contention
that compulsory licensing of the patents is still not enough relief, and there-
fore the patents should be vulnerable to challenge, seems at least debatable.
That question aside, there is at minimum, an inferrable relationship between
the bulk restraint and the dosage patents, whether other evidence supports
it or not.
The limits of the government's authority to challenge a patent in an
antitrust case are probably well expressed in the dissenting opinion. The
54. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that
once the manufacturer has parted with dominion over the product, his effort to restrict
the persons to whom the product may be sold is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
dissenting members of the Court were unable to relate the dosage patents to
the violation and concluded that:
[T]he scope of the new authority extends to any patent that hap-
pens to be present in a patent licensing agreement which contains
a restraint on alienation in a different market, regardless of its re-
lationship to such restraint.55
The last phrase is likely a non sequitur, for a patent in such an agreement
will probably be shown to have provided the necessary leverage, thus estab-
lishing a pertinent relationship. The dissenting opinion also considered that
the majority had created a "roving commission"56 by which the government
could challenge the validy of any patent related to the factual background of
the violation. This the majority denied, but not very emphatically, and only to
the extent of not permitting a challenge based on a suit which rested on the
patent being invalid. As to anything else, the question depended upon the
need for relief:
In arriving at this conclusion, we do not recognize unlimited au-
thority in the Government to attack a patent by basing an anti-
trust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid ...
Nor do we invest the Attorney General with a roving commission
to question the validity of any patent lurking in the background of
an antitrust case. But the district courts have jurisdiction ...
where a violation is found, to fashion effective relief.5 7
CONCLUSION
The authority of the government to challenge the validity of a patent in
an antitrust case depends upon its establishing a substantial case for relief
which limits the bundle of patent rights. Past antitrust cases involving pat-
ents indicate that almost invariably the patent rights have been limited. 58
Therefore, the principle issue in future cases will be whether a substantial
55. 93 S. Ct. 861, 872 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 866.
58. In addition to compulsory licensing and mandatory sales, some other types
of relief granted have been; restraint from bringing suits to collect royalties or for
infringement prior to the time of correcting the violation, United States v. New
Wrinkle, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 68,203 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 1955);
restraint from enlarging claims on pending infringement suits, United States v. Pitney
Bowles, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) 69,235 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 1959);
conditional ban on suits for infringement, United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1945 Trade Cas.) 57,404 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 1945); restraint from
setting up patent pool, Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945);
dedication of patents to public, e.g., United States v. Greyhound Corp., TRADE REG.
REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) 68,756 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1957); restraint in the sale of
patents, e.g., United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1952 Trade
Cas.) 67,248 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1952); and the ordering of non-exclusive granting
of licenses under patents issued in the future, e.g., United States v. Int'l Business
Machines Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,
1956).
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case for the relief has been established. That in turn, will raise the question
of whether the patent did or did not provide leverage for the violation. Not-
withstanding the contrary evidence found by the trial court and the strong
dissenting opinion, the fact that the United States Supreme Court found
leverage to exist in Glaxo indicates that the concept of leverage will be given
broad construction, and that evidence of leverage will be inferred from the
violation itself. Therefore, the patentee who is an antitrust defendant may
be well advised to agree to a consent decree if given the opportunity, and
accept compulsory licensing or mandatory sales, or both. 59 While this
course may be less than desirable, it may be better than having the patent
challenged. 60 However, since the patentee can lose either way, it is, after
Glaxo, that much more important that he takes great care to avoid even re-
motely linking his patent to any program potentially violative of the antitrust
laws. It is the conclusion of the writer that the limits of the government's
authority, after Glaxo, should be understood to include challenge to any
patent used by antirust defendants in an illegal program.6 1
CHARLES A. MINNE
59. This of course assumes that the government has a strong antitrust claim, as
for example, any per se violation.
60. That there is a considerable chance that the patent will be found invalid can
be inferred from the fact that 72 percent of the patents which are litigated in the
courts are held invalid. See, Testimony of Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. Mc-
Laren before the Senate Subcommittee, May 11, 1971. TRADE REG. REP. 60,120
at 55,189 (1972).
61. See the government's argument in the district court, text at 84 supra.
